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Activism and the academy: Assembling 
knowledge for social justice 
Callum McGregor and Jeremy Knox 
abstract 
This paper asks whether assemblage theory provides a useful way of thinking through 
the challenges of knowledge production for social justice in the context of the 
relationship between social movement activism and the academy. We begin by describing 
the problems associated with spatial metaphors that reinforce reified generalities 
whereby ‘horizontal’ social movements are opposed to hierarchical higher education (HE) 
institutions. We then give a brief account of DeLanda’s (2006) interpretation of the 
assemblage, focusing on the concepts of immanence and difference, actual and virtual 
and de- and re-territorialisation. Having described the problem and sketched out the 
theoretical context, we move on to consider the analytical value of assemblage theory, 
focusing on the merits of its materialist anti-essentialism. This leads on to a critical 
discussion of the ways in which speed and mobility are inscribed with normative value in 
some political readings of assemblage theory. We argue against the temptation to imbue 
any particular spatial or temporal mode with normative value. Instead, we suggest that an 
explicit recognition of time as a universal stake in social justice knowledge production 
helps us to move beyond discourses that reproduce reified oppositions. 
Introduction 
Given the extent to which academic labour has been colonised by the neoliberal 
logic, the worth of positioning oneself ‘in and against’ the academy quite rightly 
has been posed as a foundational dilemma to be addressed in this special issue. 
However, in ephemera’s issue on the ‘Excellent Institution’, Hoofd (2010) astutely 
reminds us just how problematic the very terms of this debate are, as binaries 
such as academy | activism, institution | movement, ivory tower | rhizome, 
continue to mutually presuppose and reproduce one another in a circular 
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fashion. Thus, despite the ‘unprecedented gulf between theorists of the 
revolution and its practitioners’ routinely lamented by activist-intellectuals’ 
(Graeber, 2002: 61), we share the frustrations of those dissatisfied with aspects 
of the debates around knowledge production for social justice (e.g. Autonomous 
Geographies Collective, 2010; Hoofd, 2010), which work to reproduce contingent 
boundaries and borders and obfuscate important power dynamics as a 
consequence. 
Our contribution to the dialogue is a modest inquiry into the extent to which 
assemblage theory provides a useful way of challenging such dualisms. Firstly, 
we name the problem by explaining what is wrong with ‘reified generalities’ in 
this context (DeLanda, 2006). Secondly, we give a necessarily brief account of 
assemblage theory, outlining its key concepts. This allows us to appraise the 
analytical value of assemblage theory for better understanding the material, and 
therefore also spatio-temporal, complexities at play in social justice knowledge 
production. However, there has been a tendency on the Left to ascribe spatio-
temporal norms when taking up assemblage theory. In this paper we focus on 
one particularly prominent valorisation: the combination of speed and nomadism 
in pursuit of social justice knowledge. 
Whilst we recognise that time and mobility are key stakes for any materialist 
analysis of social justice, we contend that accelerationist (a term that we will go 
on to explain) accounts of social justice knowledge production wrongly equate 
slowness with Left anachronism. Moreover, a critical materialist reading of the 
privileging of speed and nomadism reveals a problematic propensity for social 
justice activism to become caught in the same capitalist rhythms that 
compromise Higher Education as a site of emancipatory knowledge. In others 
words, without normative distortions, assemblage theory can productively work 
to critique the reified generalities that separate activism from the academy. The 
final section suggests that one way in which activist/academic knowledge can 
make common cause is through an incorporation of slow politics, which is in no 
way incommensurate with the notion of assemblage. Valorising neither slowness 
nor speed, stasis or mobility, this section calls for proper recognition of the 
complexity of spatio-temporal conditions that matter for generating social justice 
knowledge. 
What’s the problem with reified generalities? 
Assemblage theorist DeLanda (2006) proposes that a challenge for the Left is to 
replace analyses based on ‘reified generalities’ with analyses of populations of 
concrete assemblages. DeLanda uses the term ‘reified generalities’ to refer to 
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abstract concepts (generalities) brought into being through classificatory systems 
(reified) that spuriously ascribe essential characteristics to what are actually 
populations of historical singularities. Examples of such commonly invoked 
reified generalities might be ‘the market’, ‘the state’ or ‘the academy’. We take 
this insight as our starting point in this section. The history of debate 
surrounding the relationship between Left academia and social justice activism 
provides a window into several issues that remain salient to this special issue on 
academic labour. For one, there is the issue of the relevance of social movement 
scholarship to activists. For example, Bevington and Dixon’s (2005) influential 
study suggested that many North American social justice activists do not find 
academic social movement theory to be particularly insightful or 
‘operationalisable’ in a practical sense. Generally, the criticism of detached social 
movement scholarship, developed in recent years by numerous activist-
intellectuals, has been well received by activist constituencies (e.g. Choudry and 
Kapoor, 2010; Croteau et al., 2005; Graeber, 2002; Shukaitis et al., 2007). 
On the other side of this longstanding debate, and in spite of claims that 
academic research and theorising into social movements is often ‘extractive’ 
(worse still ‘parasitic’), several academics have explored the problematic 
assumption that social justice scholarship must, or should be, spontaneously 
applicable to the practice of activist constituencies (e.g. Amsler, 2013; Edelman, 
2009; Rootes, 1990). Such positions often are rooted in a reasonable scepticism 
about the instrumentalisation of creative intellectual inquiry, whose utility cannot 
be known a priori. 
These debates are certainly nothing new and share an enduring concern with the 
relationship between the material and the ideational in the context of political 
reform and revolution. For example, Adorno (critical theorist of the Frankfurt 
School) writing in 1978, lamented the fact that the Left’s rhetorical adoption of 
the dialectical unity of theory and practice, seemed to inevitably give way in the 
end to a suspicion that those unwilling to engage at a moment’s notice in activist 
practices are worthy of distrust. In fact, he termed much activism ‘pseudo 
activity’ in the sense that participants derive comfort from just doing something, 
regardless of its efficacy. 
Although such debates have as much contemporary relevance as ever, our 
concern lies more with the ways in which commentators problematically position 
themselves and the complex practices that they engage in. Social justice discourse 
habitually makes use of reified binary opposites such as such ‘grassroots’ 
knowledge | ‘ivory tower’; knowledge ‘from below’ | knowledge ‘from above’; 
‘theorists’ of the revolution | ‘practitioners’ of the revolution, and so on. It might 
be argued that such binaries help us to make important analytical distinctions. 
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Nevertheless, we have some specific concerns. Social movements and HE 
institutions are obviously not hermetically sealed spaces of knowledge 
production. To constantly reinforce such distinctions (tacitly or intentionally), not 
only masks the complex processes through which knowledge and understanding 
about/for social justice come about, but also blinds one to the persistent bending 
of capitalist production (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2006). To assume that one 
escapes the logic of capital simply through replicating established activist 
pursuits, serves not only to cloud the complex dynamics through which capital 
operates, but also to bolster the very structures it purports to circumvent. It’s not 
just that these reified binaries are wrong; rather their active use reterritorialises 
systems that, in some circumstances, move us further away from understanding 
the actual material and expressive practices through which social justice might 
come about. 
We begin from the recognition that ‘grassroots’ organising and in particular, 
‘horizontality’, are not anterior material realities but rather, discursive devices 
which serve to bolster the foundational separation of contemporary movements 
from stereotypical forms of hierarchy (Juris, 2005; Nunes, 2005). By 
‘horizontality’ we mean the propensity towards forms of organising that avoid 
hierarchical relationships. In the former case, by invoking the roots, social 
movement discourse often obfuscates routes – meaning the pathways that 
particular individuals have travelled – so that they are equipped to participate in 
specific social practices codified as ‘active’. Often, routes to activism pass through 
the academy (Morris and Staggenborg, 2004; Rootes, 2004; Rootes, 1995). The 
following diverse examples illustrate this process. 
Firstly, the relocalisation-oriented Transition movement has turned its attention 
to how local community action in response to climate change and fossil fuel 
depletion can also address social justice issues. It trades on its ‘horizontal’ and 
‘open space’ approach to knowledge production (Hopkins, 2011). The spatiality of 
the movement’s knowledge production is premised on a combination of 
‘grassroots’ local community learning and simultaneous rapid ‘rhizomatic’ 
knowledge sharing through digital space. Consequently, such discourse distances 
itself from what is perceived to be ‘elite knowledge’: 
Everything you read in this book is a result of real work in the real world, with 
community engagement at its heart. There’s not an ivory tower in sight; no 
professors in musty oak-panelled studies churning out erudite papers. (Hopkins, 
2011: 17) 
Yet existing studies of this particular movement highlight that it continues to be 
overwhelmingly composed of the ‘civic core’; that is, middle aged and ‘well 
resourced – financially, educationally and with time’ (Aiken, 2010: 96). 
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Moreover, such claims of ‘real work’ appear to retain a problematic ‘humanist 
dialectic of action and thought’ (Hoofd, 2010: 19), in which the former is 
privileged as emancipatory and self-empowering, and devoid of the exclusivity 
and discrimination of the institution. To perceive knowledge-through-action, 
however ‘open’ without partiality and prejudice, obfuscates power relations. 
Secondly, in the context of the alter-globalisation movement, several 
ethnographic accounts of  World Social Forum (WSF) (e.g. Choudry and Kapoor, 
2010; Juris, 2005; Nunes, 2005), US Social Forum (USSF) (e.g. Juris, 2008), and 
European Social Forum (ESF) (e.g. della Porta, 2005) processes have noted how 
an analogous cultural orientation towards open space and horizontal modes of 
knowledge production, have obscured the political economy of participation, 
resulting in exclusionary practices whereby processes become dominated by 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and those with the necessary 
resources and capabilities. Therefore, one is required to already possess 
particular and privileged abilities in order to simply enter the highly-competitive 
world of social justice activism.  Horizontality and openness are not the radical 
other to the supposed hierarchy of the institution and its increasingly pervasive 
neoliberal engine; they are precisely their symptom (Hoofd, 2010). 
Various poor peoples’ movements are subject to similarly problematic assertions, 
despite the fact that they often utilise the material and cognitive resources of 
universities and ‘Western’ NGOs to further their struggle whilst trying to avoid 
co-option. Kinchy’s (2010) research into farmers’ activism against transgenic 
maize in New Mexico uses the term ‘epistemic boomerang’ as a metaphor for 
this kind of process. Alternatively, McFarlane’s (2009: 567) ethnographic 
research reveals how ‘many urban social movements in Mumbai are mobilised 
and led by middle-class activists in positions of relative power, with particular 
formal educational attainments, connections in government or with donors, and 
distinct resources that they can draw upon’. As one final example, we offer Gill’s 
(2014) ethnographic study of the Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM) shack dwellers 
movement in Durban, South Africa. Gill’s (2014: 215) account of the AbM 
recognises the tension between the movement’s own pedagogical praxis and 
academics who reinforce vanguardism and ‘assume they know better than, or 
can speak for the poor’. However, AbM activist-intellectuals have cautiously 
made connections with middle-class academics, locally and through digital 
technologies, in order to connect their struggle to a wider network of resources 
and ‘engage in mutual learning’ (ibid.: 216). 
What these fairly diverse examples illustrate is that representations of social 
movements as grassroots/horizontal entities, and universities as archaic and 
isolated knowledge producing entities are common but untenable, and serve to 
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obfuscate the ways in which the practice of social justice is materially constrained 
and mediated by persistent power relations. In what follows, we explore 
assemblage theory as a way to rethink the relationships between social 
movements and the academy, in an area which has tended to reassert dualisms, 
totalities and essential identities. 
 A brief explanation of assemblage theory 
In this section we draw primarily on the assemblage theory of DeLanda (2006), 
which is derived from the philosophy of Deleuze (1994) and Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987). As such, we cannot isolate the concept of the assemblage from 
the broader ontological commitments in this work without diluting to some 
extent the potency of the ideas (Phillips, 2006). The purpose of this section is 
simply to outline, in broad terms, important aspects of assemblage theory. As 
such, we do not focus too heavily on the connections with activism and academia, 
a fuller discussion of which will follow. 
Immanence and difference 
DeLanda’s work on assemblage is about theorising what he calls 
‘morphogenesis’ (understood as the birth of form, irrespective of whether the 
entity in question is geological, biological, linguistic, political and so on). 
Morphogenesis ‘gets rid of all transcendent factors using exclusively form-
generating resources which are immanent to the material world’ (DeLanda, 
2002: 10). This foregrounding of immanence over transcendence is grounded in 
the Deleuzian concept of difference as a process (Deleuze, 1994). For DeLanda, 
Deleuze ‘conceives difference not negatively, as lack of resemblance, but 
positively or productively, as that which drives a dynamical process’ (2002: 4). In 
other words, difference is the process through which things differentiate and 
become what they are through relations with each other, rather than an abstract set 
of categorisations by which things are classified (by ‘us’) as different from. 
‘[I]nstead of something distinguished from something else’, Deleuze ‘imagine[s] 
something which distinguishes itself’ (1994: 28). 
In order to foreground immanence, DeLanda (2006) sets up an analytical 
opposition between ‘relations of interiority’ and ‘relations of exteriority’ as ways 
of thinking about wholes, structures, or bodies (call them what you will). Within 
the terms of this opposition, two further fundamental distinctions are 
respectively derived: these are logical obligation and contingent obligation. 
Relations of interiority are logically obliged in the sense that the relationships 
between ‘parts’ are ‘logically necessary’ to make the organism function as a 
structured totality. Both Hegelian dialectics and structuralism are positioned as 
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archetypal modes of thinking in which relations of interiority are foundational, 
and where ‘the entities themselves are the absolutes, and all relations between 
them are merely accidental’ (Shaviro, 2007). 
In opposition, DeLanda (2006) suggests relations of exteriority, which require a 
shift from focussing on the properties of components in the system, towards an 
additional concern for capacities, that is, potential linkages and connections with 
elements outside of the ‘body’ in question. The way that both properties and 
capacities are conceived here is crucial, because it provides assemblage theory 
with the means to avoid deterministic positions. An entity can retain properties 
that are not defined entirely from its current set of relations, and these properties 
can be understood to derive from previous relational states. As such, properties 
are understood to be contingently obligatory ‘all the way down’, rather than 
essential. An entity is therefore not entirely determined by an outside, and nor is 
it governed solely by intrinsic properties. In other words, the ‘things’ of the world 
do not have essence, only a continual production through co-constitutive 
relations, or ‘becoming’, and nor are they thought to derive exclusively from any 
present configuration of relations. Capacities are the means through which 
relations can happen, and are contingent. In other words, an entity’s potential to 
relate in a certain way must be matched by another entity’s potential to receive 
the particularities of that relationship. New relations require corresponding 
capacities, and this allows assemblage theory to acknowledge both the potentials 
and limits of change, and to identify the specifics of such eventualities. In such 
ways, acknowledging both the properties and capacities of entities, bodies, or 
structures provides the conceptual means to interrogate the complexity of given 
situations, rather than rely on the abstract ideals and norms offered by the kinds 
of generalities discussed previously. 
Our contention is that the generalities ‘activism’ and ‘academia’ appear to 
structure and maintain divisions between singular assemblages, and that the 
assemblage requires us to actively engage with the broad and complex processes 
that impinge upon and shape them. Assemblage theory encourages us to be 
specific: to consider what might be engrained properties, hardened through 
important historical relations, as well as what might be capacities for new 
associations and structural change. In this sense, we cannot begin with the 
‘academy’ and ‘social movement activism’ as predetermined, distinct, and 
bounded categories, but rather we have to work through the processes of 
differentiation through which they have been produced as such, as well as the 
important avenues through which relational change might occur. In this way, 
proponents suggest that assemblage theory is not abstract theorising, but rather 
the attempt to take specific and tangible factors into account. Rather than relying 
on generalised terms to denote difference, the focus shifts to exploring how 
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difference has come about, and in such a way, perhaps work more productively 
towards influencing the kind of differences we want to see come about in the 
future. This is an important point to stress here, because that which we call ‘the 
academy’ and that which we might term ‘social movement activism’ are different 
in important ways. However, we must recognise that that difference is not 
because of an abstract measure of an ideal state in either case, but because of 
processes of differentiation. In other words, institutions have become hardened 
and standardised around particular formalities and hierarchies, and these 
processes of differentiation are identical to those that have produced the customs 
and patterns associated with social movements. The very point of defining 
difference in this way is to get closer to what is possible and what is not possible 
in terms of change. If we maintain reified generalities, we are less inclined to 
recognise where and how the institution and the movement might actively and 
productively transform, especially in terms of their relations with each other. 
  
 Actual and virtual 
An important nuance to highlight, and the substantive difference between the 
relations of exteriority and interiority of the assemblage, is that the analogy of the 
‘network’ is not quite enough. The assemblage is not merely a set of 
determinable relations between identifiable things, but a theory that attempts to 
account for the actual and the virtual (Phillips, 2006). In other words, the 
assemblage is a set of relations that includes the potential encapsulated in the 
idea of capacity. We suggest that this is of central importance in critically 
assessing assemblage theory here, because potential, or more accurately the 
limitations and possibilities for the virtual becoming actual, is the site at which 
social justice praxis could productively operate. DeLanda articulates the notion of 
capacity in terms of ‘degrees of freedom’ (2006), attesting to the idea that the 
ability to relate remains a site of productive potential, but also signalling that one 
has to acknowledge the substantive limitations structured-in through previous 
relations that have shaped and affected the entities themselves. 
This concern for leaving open the potential for productive change is met, we 
suggest, in the actual and virtual structure of the assemblage. Where reified 
generalities tend to maintain categorisations in which transcendent models serve 
as the measure and limit of what one is considering – here the educational 
institution and the social movement – then the scope for action is significantly 
constrained. If one already assumes a particular definition of the ‘university’, 
against which any actual conditions are to be measured, the possibilities for one’s 
creative action seem to be confined by the boundaries of the transcendent form. 
The advantage of the actual and virtual ontology described here is that, to 
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paraphrase the Deleuzian take on Spinoza, ‘we don’t know what a university or a 
movement can do’. What is virtual, and what can be rendered actual through 
cohering capacities, remains unknown, and therefore an affirmative space for 
pursuing social justice praxis. 
The pragmatics of the assemblage as actual-and-virtual comes to the fore here: 
assemblages must be created not discovered. In other words, we must recognise 
that this ‘virtual’ we have been speaking of is, in part, conditioned through the 
ways that assemblage is brought into being. A crucial part of this bringing-into-
being is ‘who’ might be doing that, and this importantly enfolds the subject of 
research with the object of enquiry. Any identified assemblage is not an objective 
state, but a contingent set of relations brought into being through particular 
circumstances. Critically, this foregrounds responsibility for the ways that 
debates are framed. Assemblage theory therefore encourages us to bring into 
being the kind of activism and social justice one wants to make actual, rather 
than, through the very same process, to produce unhelpful differences, 
incommensurable distinctions, and insurmountable disparities. Indeed, we 
might then say that the claim of transcendent differences between the academy 
and social movement activism might be interpreted as the very ‘fatalism’ so often 
assumed of the ‘post-modern’ and ‘post-structuralist’ orientations attributed to 
assemblage theory. 
Turning to the specific theme of this paper, we can say that assemblage theory 
encourages one to perceive entities such as the educational institution and the 
social movement as made actual through persistent relational activity. However, 
what is made actual and what is not, and thus what these entities or systems 
manifest as at any given moment, is determined by the virtual. As we have seen, 
the appeal of DeLanda’s (2006) rendition of assemblage theory here is in the way 
we can account for the specific limitations and possibilities in this movement 
from the virtual to the actual. The academy and the social movement have 
properties that make them distinct, and these properties also define what 
domains of the virtual are open to becoming actual. 
Territorialisation 
Importantly, we also need to introduce the notion of territorialisation and 
deterritorialisation, through which assemblage theory provides a useful analysis 
of the processes of assemblage formation that we have been describing above. 
DeLanda (2006) situates these processes on a continuum: at one end we have 
the assemblage forming through homogenisation; material and expressive 
processes which standardise and regulate, and which require an analysis 
immanent to the qualitative and scalar particularities of any given assemblage. At 
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the other end of the axis we have processes that operationalize heterogeneity; 
destabilising commonality and establishing difference. It is important to 
emphasise a literal (as opposed to metaphorical) interpretation of 
territorialisation here: the colonisation or devolution of social movements and 
the academy, for example, must be considered in spatial and material terms. 
For example, HE institutions as orderings of human bodies within brick and 
mortar campuses are deterritorialised through digital technologies on the one 
hand, and are reterritorialised on the other, as distance learning programmes 
and massive open online courses (MOOCs) offer new avenues for institutional 
market expansion. This is a complex dynamic, as the perceived materiality of the 
campus frequently expresses historical and cultural clout (‘traditional authority’) 
that legitimates the enterprise that the distance learner engages with (Bayne et 
al., 2014). At the same time, the campus continues to act as a concentrated 
spatial ordering of bodies necessary to reproduce ‘bureaucratic authority’. In 
other words, it is doubtful that the institutional assemblage could function if its 
core staff were dispersed over long distances in different cities and countries. 
Within the institution, the physical co-location of small teams in marginal 
programmes (as is often the case in the social sciences and humanities) is often 
pivotal, as rationales for overcoming so-called ‘silo’ mentalities and increasing 
‘cross-pollination’ are used to justify ‘divide and rule’ management tactics. 
This has the potential to be compounded by moves towards shifting modular 
content to online modes of delivery. On the other hand, marginalised teams 
might have small ‘degrees of freedom’ to use ‘internationalisation’ and ‘e-
learning’ agendas as opportunities to widen their constituency and develop trans-
local and trans-national solidarity with students and academics who share 
particular commitments in relation to social justice. It is within these ambivalent 
spaces that opportunities for collaboration with social movement constituencies 
may exist. 
In summary then, there are three important terms we need to clarify by way of 
defining assemblage theory, and specifically why it might be important to our 
considerations of activism and the academy. Firstly, we need to think about 
difference differently; not as a way of comparing things according to abstract 
categories, but rather as the process through which things change through 
immanent relations. This would encourage us not to think about activism and 
academia as self-identical ideas differing from one another, or as dialectical 
opposites, which may or may not be synthesised. Secondly, the set of relations in 
an assemblage must be considered to span both actual and virtual connections, 
thus allowing for a coherent analysis of the potentials and limitations for change. 
This is particularly important for recognising the ways in which activism and the 
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academy can identify common causes, and acknowledge the specific kind of 
relations that might lead to productive transformations. Thirdly, processes of de- 
and re-territorialisation allow us to take account of the complex contexts through 
which things form through sameness, or change through difference. In the 
context of assembling social justice knowledge, this means paying particular 
attention to the material and expressive processes that seek to de-territorialise 
particular assemblages whilst re-territorialising others. Having outlined key 
concepts from assemblage theory, the following sections will further assess its 
value in the context of social justice, activism and academia.  
The analytical value of assemblage theory 
In order to further understand the analytical import of assemblage theory and its 
key propositions outlined above, we must begin with the specific manner in 
which it combines materialist analysis with ontological commitments to anti-
essentialism and realism. We do not need assemblage theory to deconstruct the 
linguistic categories ‘activist’, ‘academy’ and their various conceptual analogues, 
as articulated in the above section on reified generalities. Poststructuralist 
arguments in this vein are well established. Whilst such endeavours ostensibly 
remain within the remit of ‘semiotic politics’, assemblage theory encourages us 
to move towards what assemblage theorist Levi Bryant (2014) calls 
‘thermodynamic politics’. This approach, Bryant argues, is a ‘form of political 
engagement’, which targets an assemblage’s material ‘sources of energy and 
capacity for work’ – essentially through mapping its degrees of freedom – in 
order to further social justice struggles. In other words, while assemblage theory 
and poststructuralism share an anti-essentialist stance, the difference lies in the 
emphasis on materiality in the former, and specifically how accounting for this 
dimension sharpens the analytical critique. A general position that assemblage 
theorists share is that the ‘linguistic turn’ taken by Left intellectuals has had 
deleterious effects on the production of effective social justice knowledge and, in 
any case, is ‘confused about what it is doing’ (Bryant, 2014: 73). 
In what sense is this claimed to be the case? The first half of this critique 
addresses what assemblage theorist DeLanda (2006) calls ‘macro reductionism’. 
This position states that organising around big reified generalities is ineffectual 
since such generalities do not explain but require explanation. For example, 
Bryant (2014: 186-97) notes contemporary assemblage theorists’ dissatisfaction 
with what he calls ‘occult’ explanations of events and processes where it seems 
that black boxed ‘social forces’ are offered as pseudo-causes without the need to 
show the manifold material mediations – ‘powerlines, televisions, coal burning 
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power plants, governments, people’ (ibid.: 190) – that properly constitute the 
social realm. 
Secondly, at the other end of the spectrum we find the dismissal of both ‘micro 
reductionism’ and anthropocentrism. As Bryant puts it: 
[s]emiotic politics is confused in that it is premised on producing change through 
ethical persuasion, and thereby assumes that institutional machines […] are open 
to the same sorts of communicative flows as humans […] Persuading a corporation 
through ethical appeals is about as effective as trying to explain calculus to a cat. 
(2014: 73) 
In other words, effective social justice knowledge should attempt to generate a 
form of sensitivity towards the kinds of expressive and material functions that 
work to de- or re-territorialise any given assemblage. ‘Semiotic politics’ are 
therefore merely part of the expressive function of assemblages undergoing 
ongoing processes of de- and re-territorialisation. DeLanda (2006: 62), in his 
discussion of the ‘territorialising’ effects of language argues that ‘activists trying 
to change a given category are not negotiating over meanings, as if changing the 
semantic content of a word automatically meant a real change in the 
opportunities and risks faced by a given social group, but over access to resources 
(income, education, health services) and relief from constraints’. 
One might conclude that this amounts to a statement of the obvious 
masquerading as insight.  Yet we are tempted to suggest that something like 
‘thermodynamic politics’ and an acknowledgement of materiality, is useful 
insofar as it calls our attention to the relationship between spatial, temporal and 
energetic requirements of social justice knowledge production. In doing so, it 
arguably exposes the idealist scholasticism of some variants of ‘semiotic’ ideology 
critique. People, imbricated as they are in particular material conditions, firstly 
have to reckon with the obstacles of time poverty, lack of access to common 
public space, and cognitive and affective exhaustion before tussling with their 
‘interpolation’ into whichever ideological edifice ‘distorts’ their reality (Bryant, 
2014: 174). In other words, actual material conditions and limitations are 
enfolded in, and restrict any virtual capacities for change that might be brought 
about through critical awareness. As a consequence, materialist theories of social 
justice must consider time and space as a key stakes since space-time 
unproductive of exchange value might always be used to question the 
configuration of dominant social assemblages. 
This, if we follow the arguments of assemblage theorists, it opens up a sensibility 
that addresses different concerns to those generated by ‘semiotic politics’. For 
example, Emejulu and Bassel’s (2015) empirical research provides insight into 
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the material – and therefore spatio-temporal and energetic – impacts of austerity 
on minority women in relation to ‘creative political work’ against it. We can see 
this relationship between time, space and exhaustion in the following quote from 
‘a Scottish Pakistani woman volunteering at a minority women-led community 
organisation in Glasgow’: 
We’ve got a lot of stuff we have to do. Like the kids’ breakfast and stuff, it’s mainly 
us women that are doing it. Bringing and dropping them off at schools, even at the 
mosque, that’s mainly women that’s doing that. So it [cuts to services] does [have 
an impact], it quite tires a woman out. When it comes to the weekend when you 
want to spend time with the kids more, you’re more reluctant, [you want] to be 
staying in bed. (ibid.: 89) 
As blogger James put it so well in the context of precarious information work 
[i]f a worker spends 8 hours of her day at work, operating in two temporalities via 
her body and her immersion in a disembodying digital temporality […] [c]hronic 
overstimulation and under nutrition mean her brain is burned out, exhausted, and 
she must get to bed rather than crack open a copy of Capital or Hatred of 
Democracy. (2013) 
Therefore, some more ‘lines of flight’ in relation to understanding the ‘virtual 
capacity’ for social justice knowledge assemblages might, for example, involve 
inquiry into: the cognitive fatigue generated by prolonged periods of mundane 
data entry work and digital overstimulation; the ways in which new forms of time 
discipline are imposed, particularly where digital technologies blur the 
distinctions between production/consumption, work/leisure; and sleep itself as a 
site of struggle, under ‘24/7’ global capitalism (Crary, 2013). Many more such 
questions could, and should, be asked that all materially relate space, time and 
energy to issues of social justice knowledge production. Arguably, assemblage 
theory provides one such analytical ‘lens’ for doing so. A detailed exposition of 
how this might look in particular circumstances lies outside the scope of this 
discussion. Our modest aim here is to make clear a general sense of the 
approach in this context to generate further discussion. 
At this point, it is worth re-emphasising that the utility of assemblage theory in 
this context is analytical rather than normative. The question of whether or not 
any normative implications can be extrapolated from assemblage theory, as we 
have summarised it, takes us into an altogether more difficult and contentious 
terrain. Although this is a complex question, what we limit ourselves to 
discussing here are the ways in which some popular political readings of 
assemblage theory after Deleuze and Guattari, ascribe normative value to 
becoming over permanence, to mobility over stasis, speed over slowness and so 
on. For example, Foucault’s reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage theory 
raised nomadism to the level of an ethical imperative: ‘Believe that what is 
ephemera: theory & politics in organization  17(3): 509-532 
522 | article  
productive is not sedentary but nomadic’ (Foucault cited in Buchanan, 2011: 11). 
What is interesting is the way in which these preferences are given normative 
context in a precisely materialist context.  This normative privileging of speed and 
nomadism plays a key role in reproducing the reified generalities that we have 
identified as problematic. 
Speed and mobility as normative categories in assemblage theory: A 
critical intervention 
This section critically explores the relationship between assemblage theory and 
the notion that the generation of social justice knowledge might emerge from a 
techno-infused rapidity. It is generally known that Deleuze regarded the proper 
role of philosophy as the generation of new ideas. To the extent that this is also a 
prime task for the social justice oriented Left, it is instructive to ground the 
claims in this section by clarifying Deleuze (and Guattari’s) view of the 
relationship between creativity, speed and nomadism. 
It has been suggested that some of the interpretive challenges of reading Deleuze 
are down to the fact that he wrote using a kind of impatient shorthand. For 
example, DeLanda (2006) usefully points out that Deleuze’s work becomes 
clearer if we take his use of ‘affect’ to simply mean ‘capacity to affect and be 
affected’. Particularly in A thousand plateaus, there is often a particular 
relationship between speed and mobility, where the ‘concept’ is understood to be 
a ‘vector’, meaning ‘the point of application of a force moving through space at a 
given velocity in a given direction’ (Massumi cited in Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 
xii). There is a sense in which the qualitatively new is sought after through an 
attempt to escape the ‘abstract idea’ by creating the conditions for processes of 
rapid bricolage. Deleuze and Guattari together use A thousand plateaus itself as a 
thought experiment in the sense that its concepts are immanent to this logic. To 
offer just one example: 
Make rhizomes, not roots, never plant! Don’t sow, grow offshoots! […] Run lines, 
never plot a point! Speed turns the point into a line!  Be quick, even when standing 
still! Line of chance, line of hips, line of flight. Don’t bring out the General in you! 
Don’t have just ideas, just have an idea (Godard). Have short-term ideas. (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987: 2-3) 
Nevertheless, in their last writing together Deleuze and Guattari (2015) reflected 
on the tensions between this orientation towards speed, nomadism and the 
consequences of corporeal limits; specifically, anxiety and depression. Thus, it is 
not so much the work of Deleuze and Guattari per se, so much as the ways in 
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which a particular ‘vector’ of their own thought has been developed by 
succeeding Left intellectuals who have made an ‘-ism’ out of acceleration.  
Accelerationists (e.g. Mackay and Avanessian, 2014; Williams and Srnicek, 2013) 
believe that the generation of emancipatory knowledge is suppressed by the 
pernicious ‘folk’ tendencies of the Left. Instead, accelerationists start from the 
premise that the Left must move closer towards the temporality of techno-
capitalism and harness its ‘deterritorialising’ forces for egalitarian ends. That is, 
the technologies and productive forces unleashed by capitalism should be 
accelerated beyond the ‘value system, governance structures and mass 
pathologies’ of ‘late capitalism’ in a process of globalisation ‘from below’ 
(Williams and Srnicek, 2013). As Cunningham (2015) highlights in his critical 
engagement with accelerationist thought, a line can be drawn here from Deleuze 
and Guattari’s assemblage thinking, through ‘cyberpunk’ culture and to the 
present ‘theoretical enterprises that aim to conceptualise the future outside of 
traditional critiques and regressive, decelerative or restorative solutions’ (Mackay 
and Avanessian, 2014: 10). 
Accelerationists argue that traditional socio-political assemblages are ineffectual 
in the face of phenomena such as high-frequency trading algorithms that exceed 
the temporality, and therefore agency, of human thought as well as political and 
democratic processes (e.g. Rosa, 2015; Williams and Srnicek, 2013). An 
implication for accelerationists is that social justice knowledge must emerge 
from, and take account of, ‘thermodynamic politics’ (Bryant, 2014), which as we 
have outlined above is fundamentally about understanding the ways in which 
human ‘social’ agency is enmeshed with, and inseparable from, wider ecologies 
of matter in order to produce better maps for intervention. Yet beyond this 
analytical bent, who is the subject of the ‘accelerationist’ future? Where are the 
silences and what does this mean for an ‘assemblage theory’ reading of the 
relationship between activist and academic knowledge production? 
Arguably, this is just part of a broader narrative tendency within Left 
intelligentsia that moves too quickly to naively posit the immanent self-
organisation of digitally mediated social justice-oriented assemblages. In moving 
too quickly towards such grand narratives, the classed, gendered and raced social 
relations, which capitalism depends upon, are obfuscated. The implicit subject 
seems to be one at ease in an environment of rapid constant technological 
change, able to exist, adapt, ‘become’ within capital’s ‘deterritorialising’ 
tendencies. 
We see no justification for imbuing speed and mobility with normative 
tendencies just as we see no logical connection between speed, mobility and 
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creativity in the context of social justice knowledge production. If the ‘virtual’ 
potential for such utopian assemblages is misrecognised as ‘actual’ then how do 
the protagonists of such discourse avoid the dangers of moving towards a techno-
vanguardism which merely hardens perceived differences between the 
‘grassroots’ knowledge of the have-nots and the ‘elite’ knowledge of the haves?  
Avoiding this isn’t only a matter of a privileged Left making common cause with 
those less privileged. The simplification of the tendency towards a multitude of 
singularities acting in unison also fails to adequately reckon with the ideological 
work that would have to occur for those ‘virtual’ privileged change agents to 
recognise their potential in such terms as agents operating both ‘in and against’ 
flexible capitalism. The idea of the nomadic subject is easily conflated with what 
Boltanksi and Chiapello (2006) call the ‘new spirit of capitalism’: networked, 
flexible, constantly ‘becoming’, but resilient where it counts in the face of 
external pressure (Zizek, 2004). Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2006) basic 
proposition is that initially an anti-capitalist ‘artistic critique’ of alienation and 
cultural authenticity promulgated by new social movements emerging in the late 
1960s was easily co-opted by an emergent ‘new managerial order’: 
This ‘ideal typical’ figure is a nomadic ‘network-extender’, mobile, tolerant of 
difference and ambivalence […] Those lacking the requisite flexibility, who cannot 
become the nodal point of various networks, thus generating the necessary 
activity, or otherwise engage, communicate, market, innovate, add value, and so on 
and so forth, have little hope of success. (Du Gay and Morgan, 2013: 24) 
In this context, the mobile and time-rich are likely to succeed in activist as much 
as in academic milieus. Of course, their time and mobility in each context is 
underwritten by the reproduction of material infrastructures by an equally 
precarious, but necessarily immobile lower-skilled workforce. Ironically, in this 
version of events, the elevation of normative aspects of assemblage theory (the 
‘nomad’, the ‘rhizome’) to the level of ‘reified generality’ emerged not from 
materialist critique but an abandonment of it (Du Gay and Morgan, 2013; Zizek, 
2004). 
At this point in the argument, we might re-emphasise our view that that there is 
no necessary connection between assemblage thinking and good or bad spatio-
temporalities. For example, the mobility of capital across borders and physical 
mobility of bodies across borders have very different ethical implications. Rather 
than hitch our wagon to particular spatial or temporal modes, assemblage 
thinking might be productive in restricting itself to an analysis of the material 
dynamics of knowledge production. Thus, we find it important to stress that this 
is not a call to reify slowness as the ultimate condition required for an 
emancipatory form of academic scholarship. That would be to retain the 
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problematic oppositional stance that this paper is attempting to overcome. Our 
point is to call for recognition of the value of slowness to scholarship, as part of a 
necessarily complex dynamic that involves both accelerated and decelerated 
momentum. However, in the closing section, we would like to provide a 
corrective to the normative excesses of speed and mobility in some 
interpretations of assemblage theory by drawing attention to the universality of 
time as a key stake in social justice knowledge production. 
Time for social justice knowledge production 
It is surely an uncontentious fact that one of the common effects of poverty is to 
be trapped in the tyranny of the moment, which has deleterious consequences 
for long-term critical and creative thinking. On the other hand, received wisdom 
would have it that academics have space and time to think and reflect. Whilst we 
by no means are trying to justify detached scholarship through making dubious 
equivalences between academics and the oppressed, we would like to argue that 
time is a key stake for the production of emancipatory knowledge in any context. 
Social movement occupations are partially so threatening to the status quo 
because they disrupt particular rhythms of capitalist assemblages on a localised 
scale. It is worth speculating whether ‘network society’ evangelists have gotten it 
precisely the wrong way round: does the growth of the digital commons signal a 
tentative ‘actualisation’ of ‘virtual’ post-capitalist social arrangements? Or does 
the speed at which their ‘offline’ manifestations are dissolved by state-corporate 
power (such as seen in various Occupy encampments) not tell us something 
about the fact that digital spaces can proliferate as much as they like as long as 
there are no limiting factors to their production that infringe on the generation of 
profit? 
Even network society utopian Castells (2012: 169) has recently conceded that 
contemporary social justice movements such as Occupy and the 15-M movement 
are at least partially about egalitarian access to what he himself has called 
‘parentheses’ in frenetic rhythms of capital accumulation as experienced in every 
life. This has a dual aspect: on the one hand, they literally (if only on a micro 
scale) disrupt the material (and therefore spatial, temporal and energetic) flows 
that ensure these rhythms; on the other hand, they have been commonly 
described as ‘prefigurative’ movements. This phrase is significant because what 
it draws attention to is precisely the relationship between the generation of 
emancipatory knowledge and the material need for assemblages that, through 
deterritorialising urban space-times, are marked by stasis and deceleration rather 
than speed and hypermobility. To put it in assemblage language, the material 
ephemera: theory & politics in organization  17(3): 509-532 
526 | article  
functions of occupations are simultaneously expressive in the sense that merely 
occupying particular urban spaces starkly reveals patterns of ownership, the 
sociomaterial organisation of power, and its lack of tolerance for the disruption of 
urban rhythms normally dominated by the need to be, above all, productive of 
exchange value. Since control over the production and use of urban space is an 
issue directly affecting all urbanites, challenges directed at the organisers of 
space generate all manner of unlikely alliances and relationships. Under such 
circumstances, participants and bystanders cannot help but learn in and from 
such activity in unpredictable ways. In other words, such processes are educative 
in simply revealing the sheer lack of public space, time and resources available 
for engagement in collective non-commodified cultural and intellectual activity. 
To highlight another example touched on above, the Transition Towns 
movement explicitly connects knowledge production and collective learning with 
energy descent (moving away from fossil fuel reliance), relocalisation and slowing 
down the pace of daily life. And to return to just one more example discussed 
previously, the lack of time and space for collective intellectual inquiry is a 
perpetual challenge for poor peoples’ movements such as the AbM (Gill, 2014: 
215).  
One urgent task for social justice activists and educators is to find ways to 
articulate these connections between diverse movements and between activism 
and the academy. It is not our purpose here to further rehearse observations and 
arguments around academic intensification (which we assume are well known, 
particularly to the readership of this special issue). Rather it is to highlight the 
task of making common cause and to think about the role that assemblage 
thinking might play.  
The neoliberalisation of HE and an uncritical embrace of digital technology are 
two intertwined strands of the ‘accelerating’ academy. One way of explaining the 
pernicious effects on academic knowledge production is to use Erikson’s (2001) 
distinction between ‘fast time’ and ‘slow time’ in the context of his work on the 
‘tyranny of the moment’ in the ‘information age’. The tyranny of the moment 
refers to a state of frenetic standstill, a perpetual present, and its ideal typical 
mode of knowledge production becomes one of rapid ‘vertical stacking’, which 
threatens the collective endeavour for coherence. This is compounded with the 
increasing casualisation of academic staff. The pernicious implications for social 
justice knowledge production and creative inquiry are obvious, as depth and 
duration of collective engagement diminishes, and in so doing, prevents the 
territorialisation of such assemblages in institutional contexts.  
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However, it is important to emphasise that the ‘tyranny of the moment’ is not 
strictly something new to the advent of ‘network time’: as touched on above, 
people living in poverty know all about the tyranny of the moment as dealing 
with perpetual crises, and working long hours for unfair wages, rob one of time 
and energy for engagement in emancipatory politics. Here (around the universal 
recognition of time as a key stake) is the opportunity for mutual learning and 
mutual engagement, which might help to dissolve unhelpful reified generalities. 
But this involves precisely the kind of assemblage thinking, which connects the 
lived concerns and material circumstances of the entire institutional assemblage 
(catering staff, technicians, students, cleaning staff, academics, administrative 
staff, security their various unions and so on) with the various kinds of social 
movements to which we have alluded. One way of approaching this is through 
finding common cause with, and catalysing processes of learning between, 
various ‘slow movements’. In 2010, a ‘Slow Science’ academy was founded in 
Germany, whose manifesto states for example:  
We do need time to think. We do need time to digest. We do need time to 
misunderstand each other, especially when fostering lost dialogue between 
humanities and natural sciences. We cannot continuously tell you what our 
science means; what it will be good for; because we simply don’t know yet. (Slow 
Science Academy, 2010) 
In the same way that the Slow Food movement has argued for slowness as 
important to food ‘excellence’, Brian Treanor’s (2006) manifesto for the ‘Slow 
University’ and Hartman and Darab’s (2012) arguments for ‘slow scholarship’ 
might be marshalled in the context of the euphemistic ‘excellence’ regime of 
contemporary HE. However, as we have argued, it is important that we do not 
fetishise ‘fastness’ or ‘slowness’ in lieu of an analysis of social relations under 
particular economic arrangements. In Martell’s (2014) critical engagement with 
the concept of slow scholarship, he asks two crucial questions: ‘what is slow 
actually about?’ and ‘who can go slow?’. In attempting to answer the first 
question, Martell argues that ‘slow’ lumps together several arguments about the 
corporatisation of HE, the role of digital technology in capitalism and ‘employer 
power over labour’. The second question is, in our view, absolutely key. It is key 
because it urges caution over voluntarist arguments that are as salient for 
academic labour as they are for social justice movements. It recognises that ‘go 
slow’ is often code for ‘I have money to take time’ (Martell, 2014). Moreover, as 
education trade unions have increasingly recognised, actions short of strike such 
as the ‘go slow’, whilst available for some in secure employment, are increasingly 
unavailable for academics in precarious employment and on ‘zero hours’ 
contracts. 
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Treanor’s 2008 postscript to his manifesto contains some interesting reflection 
on his limited success in claiming ‘slow time’ to create a ‘robust intellectual 
community’. Although it recognises institutional constraints, it is written as 
though it is simply a matter of personal choice to slow down. Lacking is much 
sense of the urgent need to connect with other social movements (actually not by 
analogy) and trade unions since this is a fundamentally political act. It is true that 
the ‘excellent institution’ doesn’t recognise risk, indeterminacy and failure as 
necessary components of the creative engine of academic inquiry. However, 
recognising this means that academics should be prepared to, for example, stand 
alongside and vocally support ‘prefigurative’ movements like Occupy, whose 
protestors were pilloried in the popular media for their lack of programmatic 
demands. Morevoer, these protestors would have to work to find ways to act on 
the recognition that the time and resources to occupy are privileged capacities not 
accessible to those parts of the ‘99%’ they symbolically claim to speak for. 
Concluding remarks 
We began this essay by explaining why we speak poorly when we couch debates 
about academic labour in terms of ‘activism’ and the ‘academy’. Such reified 
generalities were shown to continually resurface in contemporary debates, too 
often representing social movements as horizontal planes of a-hierarchical 
relations, and institutions as archaic, inaccessible and sedentary. We suggested 
assemblage theory as a way of rethinking the dualist relationships habitually 
assumed between social movements and the academy. We defined assemblage 
theory through the concepts of immanence and difference, actual and virtual, and 
territorialisation, drawing principally on the work of DeLanda (2006). We 
elaborated on the analytical value of this theory, and emphasised the importance 
of the materialist perspectives, alongside a more-established anti-essentialist 
theoretical position. The key point here is that assemblages must be understood 
as more-than-the-social. Therefore, we must understand the linguistic categories 
‘activism’ and ‘academy’ to require explanation, rather than serving to explain the 
complex human and non-human relations that combine to produce the 
conditions they supposedly represent. Furthermore, we must also recognise that 
such complex assemblages cannot simply respond as if they were rational social 
entities. 
While we maintain that assemblage theory provides the theoretical means to 
penetrate the often complex spatio-temporal and energetic aspects of social life, 
in the final sections of the paper we highlighted the problematic tendency to 
adopt normative positions amongst some proponents of the theory. Specifically, 
we highlighted the predominance of movement in material space over fixity, for 
Callum McGregor and Jeremy Knox Activism and the academy 
article | 529 
‘rhizomatic’ material arrangements over ‘arborescent’ ones, and for speed over 
slowness. We suggest assemblage theory to have significant potential for pushing 
forward our understandings of the relationships between educational institutions 
and social movements. However we caution against such normative inclinations, 
through which oppositional orientations are maintained rather than questioned. 
Speed elitism and nomadism too often promise a utopic escape from the 
material conditions through which social justice knowledge might be pursued. 
Chiefly, we highlight the tendency to valorise digital networks for their spatio-
temporal capacities to amplify collective learning and action in ways that are 
liberated from hierarchical modes of institutional knowledge production (e.g. 
Castells, 2012). 
Ultimately, we call for social justice activists and educators to find ways to 
articulate the material – that is spatio-temporal and energetic – 
connections between diverse movements and between activism and the academy, 
and it is in this pursuit that assemblage theory can be productively put to use. 
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